Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: Protecting the Child Victim and Preserving the Rights of the Accused by Howard, Tarek
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 66 Number 4 Article 6 
1990 
Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: Protecting the Child Victim and 
Preserving the Rights of the Accused 
Tarek Howard 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Howard, Tarek (1990) "Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: Protecting the Child Victim and Preserving the 
Rights of the Accused," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 66 : No. 4 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol66/iss4/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS: PROTECTING
THE CHILD VICTIM AND PRESERVING THE RIGHTS
OF THE ACCUSED
I. INTRODUCTION
Our society is becoming more aware of the high incidence of
sexual abuse of children.' While it is difficult to obtain accurate
statistics, it is estimated that one in four girls and twelve to fifteen
percent of all children will be the victims of sexual abuse.2
Because many cases of child sexual abuse go unreported, it is diffl-
cult to ascertain whether child abuse is actually increasing in fre-
quency or whether more cases are merely being reported.3
However, it is generally conceded that the problem of child abuse
is becoming more prevalent.4
The prosecution of a child sexual abuse case often is a compli-
cated, intense, and problematic procedure. One major reason for
the difficulty in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases is the age of
the victims. 5 The age of the victims is of concern because
obtaining legally sufficient testimony from a frightened young
child can be very difficult.6
In addition to the age concern, the unique nature of the crime
itself creates problems in the prosecution process. Because the
majority of sexual abuse incidents occur in the privacy of the vic-
tim's home, there are rarely witnesses.7 In addition to the lack of
1. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 177 (1983) [hereinafter Summit, Child Abuse Syndrome]. Summitt stated,
"[s]exual abuse of children is much more common and more damaging to individuals and to
society than has even been acknowledged by clinical or social scientists." Id. at 178.
2. Hagans, How Best to Heal a Shattered Child, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 10,
1989, at 68-69 [hereinafter Hagans, Shattered Child]. See Summit, Child Abuse Syndrome,
supra note 1, at 180 (noting that young males are more reluctant to admit to sexual
victimization, thus more females were available for study).
3. Child Abuse and Neglect Litigation: A Manual for Judges 3 (A.B.A. 1989Xquoting
Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect: An American Concern 30-50 (1978) (N.Y.C. Practicing
Law Institute)). See also Cares, Videotaped Testimony of Child Victims, 65 MICH. BJ. 46
(1986). Cares states that "It cannot be determined whether this type of crime is becoming
more pervasive or whether because of media attention, more cases are being reported." Id.
at 46 (footnote omitted).
4. Comment, Legislative Response to Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The Hearsay
Exception and the Videotape Depoition, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1021, 1022-23
(1985)Xhereinafter Comment, Legislative Response]discussing the scope of the problem).
The author estimated that 100,000 to 500,000 American children would be sexually abused
in 1985. Id.
5. Id. at 1024. It has been estimated that one-half of the victims of child sexual abuse
are under the age of 11. Id. at 1023.
6. Note, Preserving the Child Sexual Abuse Victim's Testimony: Videotaping is Not the
Answer, 2 DEr. C.L. REV. 469, 472 (1987)[hereinafter Note, Videotaping is Not the
Answer(discussing the role of the child as a participant in the criminal justice system).
7. See Comment, Legislative Response, supra note 4, at 1024.
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witnesses, it has been reported that fifty percent of child victims
are abused by their relatives.8 Thus, there often exists a relation-
ship of trust between the perpetrator and the child victim. 9 Often
this relationship will prevent the child from disclosing the incident
to other adults.' 0 Therefore, instead of considering themselves
victims, sexually abused children often feel as if they are accom-
plices to the crime." Each of these unique attributes of a child
abuse case serves to compound the problems inherent in having a
young child testify in court.
In addition to the nature of the crime and the tender age of
many of the victims, our criminal justice system applies its own
strains on the prosecution of a child sexual abuse case. One does
not have to be a child to appreciate how intimidating appearing in
court may be.' 2 The environment of the court room is simply not
conducive to obtaining accurate, untainted testimony from most
child victims of sexual abuse.'
3
Some jurisdictions have realized and tried to correct the
8. See Hagans, Shattered Child, supra note 2, at 68. Hagans, discussing the frequency
in which a family member is the abuser, stated:
Clinicians estimate that half the reported cases of sexual abuse take place in
families. Unfortunately, families tend to circle the wagons to avoid public
exposure. Silence, especially if it leads to further abuse, will damage a child's
trust of adults. Yet children fear reporting abuse because they do not want to
hurt their families. Parents should be sensitive to this, should stress that the
abuse is not the child's fault and should make a report even if it means turning in
a family member.
Id.
9. Summit, Child Abuse Syndrome, supra note 1, at 181.
10. Id. Summit explains some of the various threats that abusers apparently tell their
victims in order to prevent the victim from disclosing the incident(s):
-his is our secret; nobody else will understand." "Don't tell anybody.""'Nobody will believe you." "Don't tell your mother; (a) she will hate you, (b) she
will hate me, (c) she will kill you, (d) she will kill me, (e) it will kill her, (f) she will
send you away [sic] (g) she will send me away or (h) it will break up the family
and you'll all end up in an orphanage." "If you tell anyone (a) I won't love you
anymore, (b) I'll spank you, (c) I'll kill your dog, or (d) I'll kill you."
Id.
11. Cares, Videotaped Testimony of Child Victims, 65 MICH. B.J. 46, 46 (1986)
[hereinafter Cares, Videotaped Testimony]. As a result of perceiving themselves as victims,
Cares states that child victims of sexual abuse are less likely to make "open, public
disclosures than other types of victims." Id.
12. Id. at 47. Cares explains the courtroom setting as follows:
[t]he traditional courtroom setting is not fertile grounds for full and complete
disclosure of the truth. The child ... is marched into the courtroom in front of
12 or more jurors, total strangers to the child. Although not unsympathetic, the
jurors are, like the child, very uncomfortable.... The child, isolated from parent
or support persons, sits on the witness stand. In his or her line of sight is the
alleged perpetrator, who has probably threatened the child.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13. Id. Cares states, "[O]ur criminal justice system does a disservice to a child victim
when we make that child relive the dreadful experience over and over again by repeating
details of the sexual episode(s) to a number of different people." Id.
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problems associated with child sexual abuse prosecutions. 14 These
states have taken measures to protect child victims from the rigors
of prosecuting a sexual abuse case.' 5 However, the constitutional
rights of the defendant become a central issue when the state
attempts to make testifying easier, more accurate, and less painful
for the child victim. 16 The constitutional right of the defendant
most often threatened when states enact child protectionary laws
is the right of confrontation granted by the sixth amendment. 7 In
addition to affecting the constitutional rights of the defendant,
jurisdictions that enact protectionary legislation for child victims
of sexual abuse may actually create laws that conflict with the rules
of evidence.' 8 Evidentiary difficulties arise because most child
protective legislation involves practices whereby the child victim's
testimony is given outside the presence of the defendant. 9 When
such testimony is involved the concept of "hearsay" becomes an
issue.20
This note will discuss the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as well as the Hearsay Rule and its exceptions. In so
doing, this note will describe the various courses that some states
have taken in an attempt to shield the child victim while protect-
ing the rights of the defendant.
14. Bulldey, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other
Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Case, 89 DICK. L. REv. 645 (1984-85)
[hereinafter Bulldey, Evidentiary Trends in Legislation and Child Abuse]. Bulldey lists the
following as purposes for enacting protective legislation: 1) the modification of legal
procedures so as to make them more sensitive to child victims; 2) an increase in the
conviction rate for sexual abuse of children; 3) provide special treatment programs for the
child, the family, and the abuser. Id.
15. Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without Testimony in Court By The
Victim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131, 132 (1981-82) [hereinafter Note, Parent-Child
Incest](discussion of the traumatic effects in court testimony can have on the psychological
balance of a sexually abused child).
16. See Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1988) [hereinafter
Graham, The State of the Relationship(describing the effects of the confrontation clause on
states attempts at protecting child witnesses).
17. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides that, "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . I. " Id. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1987Xdiscussing the 6th
amendment in the context of a child sexual abuse case).
18. See WHITCOMB, SHAPIRO & STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES
FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS, 69 (1985) hereinafter WHITCOMB, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A
CHILD](discussing the difficulty in prosecution when out of court statements made by the
child victim are excluded because often these statements are the only evidence on the
government's side).
19. See Graham, The State of the Relationship, supra note 16, at 523 (categorizing one
group of cases in which the confrontation clause becomes involved when the statements to
be admitted were made out of court).
20. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Rule 801(c) provides: "'Hearsay evidence' is evidence of a
statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." Id.
1990] NOTE 689
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II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CONCEPT
The concept that the accused has a right to meet face to face
with his accuser has been implanted in the soul of American juris-
prudence.2 ' The belief exists that in order for justice to be carried
out, the accused and the accuser must meet in a face to face
encounter.' This thought is not new in jurisprudential history.
s3
There are numerous examples where the right to confront one's
accusers is described in the Bible.24 At early common law, con-
frontation, as a right, was available only to those accused of non-
treasonous crimes.a In 1552, the British Parliament attempted to
remedy this situation so that the right was extended to those
accused of crimes against the state as well.26 This effort was unsuc-
21. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PuB. L. 381,
381 (1959)Xhereinafter Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation]. Pollitt quotes a Press Release of
the remarks of President Eisenhower on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Anti-
Defamation League, Nov. 23, 1953. Id. President Eisenhower stated:
I was raised in a little town of which most of you have never heard. But in
the West it is a famous place. It is called Abilene, Kansas. We had as our Marshal
for a long time a man named Wild Bill Hickock.... Now that town has a code,
and I was raised as a boy to prize that code. It was: meet anyone face to face
with whom you disagree. You could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any
damage to him, without suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry....
In this county, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up in
front. He cannot hide behind the shadow. He cannot assassinate you or your
character from behind....
Id. at 381.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the witnesses
against him... Id. The sixth amendment, however, does not specifically require face to
face encounters. See id.
23. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation, supra note 21, at 384. The history of the right
to confront one's accusers can be traced back to the Roman empire. Id. An illustration of
the Roman adherence to the requirement of confrontation between the accused and his
accuser can be found in the New Testament where the following is stated, "To them I
answered, 'It is not the custom of the Romans to deliver any man to destruction before the
accused meets the accusers face to face, and has opportunity to answer for himself
concerning the charges against him.'" Id. at 384-85.
24. Id. at 384.
25. See id. at 388. Early in English history, proving treason was accomplished by
torturing those accused of the crime. Id.
26. See 1 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 521 (1551). In Howell, it is stated:
[Blut when the duke of Somerset came to be tried both for Treason and Felony,
he had not the benefit of the accusers being brought face to face, but was
proceeded against upon depositions read in the court ... and that occasioned the
Act which the commons grafted upon a Bill sent down by the lords in the
subsequent sessions.... By which Act, no person shall be indicted, arraigned, &
c. unless the offender be accused by two lawful accusers; which accusers, at the
time of the Arraignment, shall be brought in person before the party so
accused ....
Id. at 521(g). Thus, as long ago as the sixteenth century, it has been required that, to be
properly accused of a crime, your accuser should have the veracity to make such accusa-
tions in your presence. Id.
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cessful, however, and the right of a person accused of crimes
against the state to confront and cross-examine his or her accuser
was not granted until the early 17th century.27
The reason generally advanced in support of the right of con-
frontation is the assumption that the only effective way of evaluat-
ing honesty or lack of honesty is by observing the accused and the
accuser as they interact in a judicial proceeding.2 An additional
reason advanced in support of the right of an accused to confront
his accuser stems from the foundation of the Bill of Rights.2 9 As a
society, we seem to believe that to commit an individual to incar-
ceration without following very rigid guidelines would seem to
offend the spirit of due process.30 Even our own Supreme Court
has stated that it is more difficult to lie to a person face to face then
to tell a lie behind his back.3 ' Thus, the concept of confrontation is
clearly an important concept in our legal system.
27. See Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation, supra note 21, at 389. As pointed out by
Pollitt, the right of confrontation was brought into the mainstream of English jurisprudence
through the trial of one John Lilburne, alias Freedom John. Id. Apparently Lilburne
refused to answer accusations made against him that he had illegally imported secular books
into the country until he was confronted by his accusers. Id. at 390. Lilburne was charged
with contempt and jailed. Id. Finally, in 1640, Charles I called in a parliament to raise
funds. Id. It was this Parliament that set Lilburne free, stating formally that "the sentence
of the Star Chamber given against John Lilburne is illegal, and against the liberty of the
subject: and also bloody, cruel, barbarous, and tyrannical." Id. Thus, there was no longer a
dispute in England. The right to confrontation had been established. Id.
28. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988). Justice Scalia stated in Coy:
It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his
back.' In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less
convincingly. The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness
to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the
trier of fact will draw its own conclusions.
Id. at 1019. See also Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 375-76 (1956). Inlay, justice Douglas quoted
Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. stating:
An honest witness may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story
looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the
facts. He can now understand what sort of human being that man is. As for the
false witness, the tribunal can learn ever so much more by looking at him than
by reading an F.B.I. abstract of his story. The pathological liar and the personal
enemy can no longer hide behind a piece of paper.
Boyd, 351 U.S. at 375-76 (quoting Z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 35 (1956)).
29. See generally Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim, The Rules of Evidence, and
the Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen and Not Heard?, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227,
249-53 (1988)hereinafter Feher, Should Children Be Seen and Not Heard](a discussion of
constitutional prohibitions as they relate to child sexual abuse cases and the difficulties faced
by the defendant in a child sexual abuse case).
30. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1969). In Winship, Justice Harlan stated in his
concurring opinion: "[I] view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Id.
31. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988). Justice Scalia points out that the
Confrontation Clause does not, "compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant." Id.
Thus, it would appear that Justice Scalia believes that the jury can infer a false accusation if
the witness does not confront the defendant.
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Since the confrontation clause is such an important issue in
child sexual abuse cases, it is essential to discuss the seminal case in
this area of the law, Coy v. Iowa.a2 Coy involved a defendant who
had been charged with two counts of engaging in lascivious acts
with a child.3 3 Subsequent to the beginning of Coy's trial, the
prosecution made a motion pursuant to a then recently enacted
Iowa statute which allowed the accusing witnesses to testify while
located behind a large screen.34 The state court granted the pros-
ecution's motion, and a large screen was placed between defend-
ant Coy and the testifying child witness.3 5 Coy adamantly
objected to the screen's use on grounds that use of the screen vio-
lated his sixth amendment right of confrontation.38 In addition,
Coy contended that the screen would cast an appearance of guilt
on himself, thus violating his right to due process.37 Coy was con-
victed at the trial court level, and the Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction.
Coy appealed to the United States Supreme Court.3 9  The
Court concerned itself with addressing the constitutional issue of
confrontation only.40 After relating the history of the confronta-
tion clause, the Court settled into discussing the requirement that
the defendant be provided with an opportunity for a face to face
encounter with the accusing witness.4' Justice Scalia delivered the
plurality opinion of the court. He concluded that the process
undertaken by the Iowa court resulted in the violation of Coy's
constitutionally protected rights.42 Thus, the Court concluded in
32. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
33. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1012. John Avery Coy was arrested in August 1985 and charged
with sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls. Id. at 1014. Coy accosted the victims as they
lay sleeping in a tent pitched in the back yard of his next door neighbor. Id.
34. Id. at 1014. The state made a motion pursuant to IowA CODE § 910 A.14 (1987),
which provides in pertinent part:
The court may require a party be confined (sic] to an adjacent room or
behind a screen or mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during
the child's testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear the party.
However, if a party is so confined, the court shall take measures to insure that
the party and counsel can confer during the testimony and shall inform the child
that the party can see and hear the child during testimony.
Id. The screen allowed Mr. Coy to vaguely see the witnesses, however the girls could not
see Mr. Coy. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015.
35. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014.
36. Id. at 1015. Coy argued that the confrontation clause mandates criminal
defendants have the right to face-to-face confrontation. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Coy v. Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 3260 (1987).
40. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1022.
41. Id. The Supreme Court found that Coy's sixth amendment right had been violated,




Coy that the defendant has a right to actually face his accusers.43
While Coy concluded that defendants are entitled to face
their accusers, the opinion did not articulate the enforceable
bounds of that right.44 In fact, Scalia stated, "We leave for another
day, however, the question whether any exceptions exist."'45 Thus,
the Supreme Court appears to have left the question of the scope
of the right to be decided by the lower courts.
After the Coy decision, the Supreme Court of Iowa decided
State v. Hoversten.46 Hoversten also involved the sexual assault of a
young child.47 Much like Coy, the prosecution made a motion pur-
suant to an Iowa statute, which allowed the child to testify while
seated behind a one way mirror."8 Again, like in Coy, Hoversten,
the defendant, appealed his conviction on grounds that his sixth
amendment right to confrontation had been violated.49 However,
in sharp contrast to the Coy decision, the Hoversten court made an
individualized finding that it was in the best interests of the child
to grant the protective order.50 The Iowa Supreme Court relied
on Coy's apparent recognization of exceptions to the accused's
right to face to face encounters with his accuser .5  The Court con-
cluded that because the child was in need of the protective order,
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1022. Justice O'Connor stated the following in her concurring opinion
regarding the scope of the confrontation clause:
While I agree with the Court that the Confrontation Clause was violated in this
case, I wish to make clear that nothing in today's decision necessarily dooms such
efforts by state legislatures to protect child witnesses.... There is nothing novel
about the proposition that the Clause embodies a general requirement that a
witness face the defendant .... But it is also not novel to recognize that a
defendants 'right physically to face those who testify against him,' .. . even if
located at the 'core' of the Confrontation Clause, is not absolute, and I reject any
suggestion to the contrary in the Court's opinion.
Id. at 1023 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1986)).
45. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021. Speculation would suggest that had there been a finding
that the victims in Coy required testimonial protection, perhaps the outcome would have
been different. See id. at 2803. Scalia stated, "[T]here have been no individualized findings
that these particular witnesses needed special protection, the judgment here could not be
sustained by any conceivable exception." Id. Thus, this would seem to suggest that had
their been such findings, the outcome might have been different. Cf id.
46. 437 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa 1989).
47. State v. Hoversten, 437 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Iowa 1989Xaddressing the conviction of
the defendant for the second degree sexual abuse of his four-year-old step-daughter).
48. Id. at 241. In Hoversten a one-way mirror was placed between the defendant and
the witness which allowed the defendant to see the child, but prevented the child from
seeing the defendant. Id. The statute at issue in Hoversten was IOWA CODE § 910 A.14(1).
For the text of section 910 A. 14(1), see supra note 34.
49. Hoversten, 437 N.W.2d at 241.
50. Id. The evidence was overwhelming that the victim had been exposed to
outrageous sexual abuse. Id. A hearing was conducted to establish whether the child was
competent to be a witness at which time it was discovered that the child was suffering from
post-traumatic stress syndrome. Id.
51. Hoversten, 437 N.W.2d at 241.
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the trial court had not erred in granting the motion, and the con-
viction was affirmed.52 Thus, it appears that Coy may not mandate
the death of all state enacted child witness protective statutes that
allow the testifying witness to avoid the eye contact of the
defendant.5 3
B. THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AS IT RELATES TO
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTION
Frequently the child who is a victim of sexual abuse does not
testify at trial.54 Because the Constitution guarantees the accused
the right to confront his or her accuser, a constitutional issue often
arises.55
The relationship between the defendant's right to confront his
accuser and society's interest in the protection of child witnesses is
often addressed in child abuse prosecution.5 Therefore, it is not
surprising that the scope of protection the sixth amendment pro-
vides for a defendant has historically been hotly contested.57 As
discussed in the previous section, the Supreme Court has not
clearly articulated the scope of the defendant's right to a face to
52. Id. at 242.
53. Id.
54. See Sunnitt, Child Abuse Syndrome, supra note 1, at 187 (noting the process
which often leads to dismissal of sexual abuse complaints in incestuous cases as a
combination of individuals not wanting to get involved).
55. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
56. Comment, Criminal Law - Right of Confrontation - Screen Used at Trial that
Prevents Testifying Child Sex Abuse Victim From Viewing Accused Violates Accused's Sixth
Amendment Right to Face to Face Confrontation, 20 ST. MARY'S LJ. 219, 222
(1988){hereinafter Comment, Screen Used at Trial]. The author of this comment classified
court decisions to either protect the alleged child victim or uphold the rights of the
defendant into three categories. Id. at 222. These categories were described as: 1)
Decisions that involve the constitutionality of states statutes designed to prevent the
testifying child from seeing the defendant. Id. 2) Decisions involving state statutes that
allow into evidence the videotaped testimony of child victims. Id. 3) Decisions which allow
into evidence the child's testimony to be broadcast into the courtroom via closed-circuit
television. Id.
57. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1894). Mattox is an early example of
courts' attempts to define what weight should be assigned to the defendant's right to
confront his accuser. Id. In Mattox the court stated:
[A] personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he lives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief. There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose
the benefit of any of these safeguards even by the death of the witness.... But
general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and
valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case.
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face confrontation with his accuser.5 Thus, until the Supreme
Court specifically mandates the scope of the accused's right to
physically face his accuser, there will be many instances where
lower courts will have to review sexual abuse convictions.
There are many scenarios which may result in an alleged child
abuse victim's not testifying in court.5 9 These scenarios can usu-
ally be categorized into two groups. The first general category is
when a judicial determination of witness incompetence is made.'
The second category encompasses cases where, as a result of pro-
tectionary measures enacted in the jurisdiction in which the trial
was to take place, the exclusion of the child's conventional testi-
mony is mandated.6 '
Under the first category, the child will not be allowed to tes-
tify because the presiding judge declares the child incompetent to
be a witness." At early canon law, children who had not reached
puberty were disqualified to act as witnesses.83 However, this
58. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988). Justice Scalia stated, "It is true that
we have in the past indicated that rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause are not
absolute, and may give way to other important interests." Id.
59. See generally Graham, The State of the Relationship, supra note 16, at 539-58.
Graham describes various scenarios in which the child witness may not testify. Id.
Included in his analysis are the following classifications: (1) Testifying Witness - while a
witness may be physically present, if that witness claims not to recall, establishes silence by
relying on a privilege, or is unable to testify, the witness is deemed unavailable; (2)
Available but Nontestifying Witness - in such a scenario, the witness is available to either
side but is not called to testify; (3) Unavailable declarant in this scenario, the statements of
an unavailable declarant will be admissible if such statements possess adequate indicia of
reliability; (4) Incompetency - if a witness is deemed incompetent, that individual will not
be allowed to testify. Id. at 539-55.
60. See generally Feher, Should Children be Seen and Not Heard, supra note 29, at
248. Feher relies on State of Hawaii v. McKellar, Criminal No. 85-0553 (1st Cir. Haw., Jan.
15, 1986), to show an example of a trial judge's determination of incompetence regarding
two alleged victims of sexual abuse. Id. at 248-49. Feher described the trial judge's decision
to disqualify the child witness as follows:
[A] trial judge granted the defendant's motion to disqualify two children alleged
to be the victims of sexual abuse. The court found repeated violations of proper
interviewing techniques, a lack of corroborating evidence, and a failure to
record key interviewing sessions.... Under the facts of the case, the court found
that the state could not meet [the burden of proving personal knowledge] and
that as such, the children's testimony was incompetent and inadmissible.
Id.
61. See, e.g., People v. James, 451 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990Xconviction for
child abuse was affirmed over defendant's contention that videotaped statement of child
victim violated defendant's right to confrontation); State v. Ross, 451 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. Ct.
App. 199OXconviction affirmed on resumption of two-way video process of child victim of
sexual abuse testimony).
62. See Graham, The State of the Relationship, supra note 16, at 554-55. Graham
describes the personal qualifications required to allow for a judicial determination of
competency. Id. There must be an adherence to the requirements set out in the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Id. In addition, the witness must have both the physical and mental
capacity to tell the truth. Id. The witness must be able to determine between truth and
fantasy and be capable of perceiving and communicating impressions of fact. Id. Finally,
the witness must have the ability to communicate effectively. Id.
63. Note, The Competency Requirement For The Child Victim Of Sexual Abuse: Must
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view was not accepted at common law. In King v. Braiser,' the
defendant was charged with, and convicted of, raping a child who
was less than seven years of age.' The defendant appealed his
conviction.' The court was unanimous in their decision that no
testimony could be received in evidence except under oath and
since the child was not called to testify, the court found for the
defendant.6 7 However, in discussing the competence of a child to
act as a witness the court stated:
[A]n infant, though under the age of seven years, may be
sworn in a criminal prosecution, provided such infant
appears, on strict examination by the Court, to possess a
significant knowledge of the nature and consequences of
an oath, for there is no precise or fixed rule as to the time
within which infants are excluded from giving evidence;
but their admissibility depends upon the sense and reason
they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood,
which is to be collected from their answers to questions
propounded to them by the Court; but if they are found
incompetent to take an oath, their testimony cannot be
received.68
The Brasier court, however, granted the defendant a pardon
because the child victim had not given live testimony in the initial
trial.6 9 Although this case is over two hundred years old, the mod-
ern courts continue to adhere to the proposition that a child
should not be excluded from the witness stand based solely on a
consideration of age.7 0 Thus, because young children are not auto-
We Abandon It?, 40 U. MLAMI L. REv. 245, 248 (1985Xhereinafter Note, Competency
Requirement For the Child Victim].
64. 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779).




69. Id. at 203.
70. E.g., State v. Werner, 16 N.D. 83, 89, 112 N.W. 60, 62 (1907). The North Dakota
Supreme Court stated as early as 1907 that the competency of a child witness is not to be
based solely on the age of the child:
The correct rule, and the one adopted by the great weight of modem
authorities, is that there is no certain age at which the dividing line between
competency and incompetency may be drawn. Intelligence, rather than age,
should guide the court in determining the competency of the witness; and the
trial court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, after an examination of the
witness will determine whether the child possesses sufficient intelligence to
comprehend the obligation of an oath.
Id. at 89, 112 N.W. at 62.
For a modem expression of the same axiom see State v. Schill, 406 N.W.2d 660, 661
(N.D. 1987). In Schill, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that "a relationship
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matically disqualified as witnesses, judges must make an independ-
ent determination of a child's competence to act as a witness.7'
Judges, in determining a child witness' competence, often
base their determination on responses which the child gives to a
series of questions designed to test the child witness' ability to
define what telling the truth means.72 It has been noted, however,
that many competent adults would have difficulty in formulating a
comprehensible definition of the concept of truth.73 Thus, a
judge's ability to accurately predict a child's ability to understand
the truth is an important factor in determining the child's compe-
tence to take the stand.
74
between age and honesty has not to date been established, and age is a somewhat arbitrary
discriminator of legal competency to testify in court." Id. at 661.
71. Note, Sexually Abused Children: The Best Kept Legal Secret, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HuM.
Rrs. ANN. 441,453-454 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Sexually Abused Children]. The author of
this note weighs the court's duty to make a competence ruling with the courts ability to
give a limiting instruction, noting: "Cautionary instruction, however, will not cure an
inadequate examination into the competency of a minor to testify. The trial judge is at all
times under the responsibility to reach a determination only after a comprehensive
evaluation of all elements fundamental to the inclusion of testimony against an accused."
Id. at 454.
72. See In re J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Iowa 1989). In evaluating the competency of
a child, the judge will try and discern if the child knows the difference between a lie and
the truth. Id. An example of questioning that a judge might use in making such an
evaluation is as follows:
Q. (Judge) Do you know what it means to tell the truth, Brad?
A. (Brad, the 4 year old victim) If you can.
Q. If you can?
A. If you can, you have to....
Q. I didn't understand what you said, Brad.
A. You don't have to say it, Tom.
Q. Hey, do you know what it is to tell a lie?
A. You mean, if you tell a lie, you have to get in big trouble.
Q. You are in big trouble. Do you know the difference between the truth and a
lie?
A. The truth means if you can, you have to.
Q. I am sorry, I didn't understand what you said, Brad.
A. The truth means if you can, you have to tell the truth, but - to the judge.
Q. You have to tell the truth to the judge?
A. (Witness nods head affirmatively).
Q. Will you tell the judge any lies?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what a lie is?
A. Yeah.
Q. What is a lie?
A. Meaning you are in - you are in big trouble.
Q. It means you are in big trouble. So when you tell us some things here today,
you are going to tell us the truth?
A. Yeah.
Id. The child victim in this case was found competent and his testimony was admitted. Id.
73. Cares, Videotaped Testimony, supra note 11, at 47. Cares stated, while discussing
the judge's process of asking the child witness the question "What does it mean to tell the
truth?" that, "A number of well-educated and confident adults would have difficulty in
articulating a cognitive response to that question." Id.
74. See Note, Sexually Abused Children, supra note 71, at 454. The trial judge's ability
to ascertain whether a child is capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood is critical as a
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In addition to determining a child's ability to tell the truth, a
judge must consider the rules of evidence when determining the
competency of the child to provide testimony in most judicial pro-
ceedings."5 One rule of evidence which must be considered in
child sexual abuse prosecutions appears as North Dakota Rule of
Evidence 403.76 This rule provides that relevant evidence may be
discarded if the value of such evidence is outweighed by the
potential unfair prejudice it may cause the defendant.7 7 Thus, this
rule requires that the probative value of the evidence be evalu-
ated before the evidence is admitted."8 In making such an evalua-
tion, the trial judge is permitted discretion in determining the
probative value of such evidence.79 Accordingly, a trial judge
would be able to exclude the testimony of a child based on the
judge's belief that the particular evidence would cause unfair prej-
udice to the defendant.8 0
judicial determination of incompetence on the part of the alleged victim to testify will
likely result in acquittal of the defendant. Id.
75. See N.D.R. EvID. 1101(a). North Dakota Rule of Evidence Rule 1101(a) states
"These rules apply to all courts and magistrates of this state." Id. Thus, a trial judge will be
required to adhere to the rules of evidence in child sexual abuse prosecutions. Id.
76. N.D.R. Evid. 403. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. See also Feher, Should
Children Be Seen and Not Heard, supra note 29, at 245-46. In discussing the effect of the
"Prejudice Rule," Feher stated:
The 'Prejudice Rule' has its goals, inter alia, the avoidance of misdecision by the
fact-finder and the promotion of real and perceived fairness in the judicial
process. Trials cannot be viewed as scientific processes in which abstract
evidence will be weighed and accorded its just value. The true realist must
recognize that jurors, as human beings, are susceptible to undue influence. As
such, it is paramount that the trial judge guard against the admission of evidence
that will lead juries to decisions not solidly founded upon reliable evidence.
Id.
77. See N.D.R. EvID. 403. For the text of North Dakota Rule of Evidence Rule 403 see
supra note 76.
78. See N.D.R. EvID. 403. The legal definition of probative is: "In the law of evidence.
Having the effect of proof; tending to prove, or actually proving."
79. See United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1977). Robinson involved
the defendant's appeal of his conviction for bank robbery. Id. at 507. On appeal, one issue
became "what standard of review is to be applied in reviewing the trial court's exercise of
discretion in balancing the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect."
Id. at 509. In answering the question, the Robinson court stated:
Broad discretion must be accorded to the trial judge in such matters for the
reason that he is in a superior position to evaluate the impact of the evidence,
since he sees the witnesses, defendant, jurors, and counsel, and their mannerisms
and reactions. He is therefore able, on the basis of personal observation, to
evaluate the impressions made by witnesses, whereas we must deal with the cold
record.
Id. at 514 (citations omitted). It is apparent that reviewing courts are hesitant to interfere
with the trial judge's exercise of discretion. Id.
80. See Feher, Should Children Be Seen and Not Heard, supra note 29, at 245. Feher is
of the opinion that Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which is virtually identical to its North
Dakota counterpart, "should provide for the exclusion of child testimony." Id. It is
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Another important rule relating to the competence of the
child to act as a witness is North Dakota Rule of Evidence 601.
This rule simply states that, "Every person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.""' As such,
Rule 601 operates to include all as competent witnesses unless the
application of a documented exception is mandated. 2 The inter-
action of North Dakota Rule of Evidence 601 and other rules that
may act as exceptions can provide yet another avenue in which
the child victim might be disqualified as a witness.83
It is apparent that the conclusions a judge draws regarding the
competency of a child victim to perform as a witness can substan-
tially affect the prosecution of a child sexual abuse case. A judicial
determination of incompetence, and the resultant unavailability of
the child victim as a witness, will undoubtedly initiate a claim by
the defendant that his constitutional right to confront the oppos-
ing witness has been violated.84 Many states have realized this
fact. With this realization has come ingenious attempts by state
legislators to circumvent the problems associated with balancing
interesting to note that Feher's article centers on the rights of the defendant as its central
theme. Id. at 229-230.
81. N.D.R. Evid. 601.
82. See N.D.R. EVID. 601. North Dakota Rule of Evidence 602 states in part, "A
witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that [he] has personal knowledge of the matter." N.D.R. EvID. 602. This rule
appears to act as yet another test to include in the judge's arsenal for determining the
competence of the child witnesses to testify. Id. See also Feher, Should Children Be Seen
and Not Heard, supra note 29, at 247. Feher notes:
The traditional test of competency for a witness is that the witness must: (1)
have actual knowledge of the matter to which he will testify, (2) have a
recollection of those events, (3) be able to communicate the information to the
trier of fact, and (4) be able to appreciate the gravity of the oath or the
importance of telling the truth.
Id. (citing 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 478, 506 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979)).
83. See Feher, Should Children Be seen and Not Heard, supra note 29, at 246. Feher
describes a child victim's inability to meet the requirements of FED. R. EVID. 601:
The states vary as to their definitions of competence, but a significant
number require... denying competency where the child appears incapable of
receiving accurate impressions truthfully.
It seems clear that, once the child has under gone excessively suggestive
interviewing techniques, she is patently unable to meet these qualifications.
First, it is at least questionable whether there were any events which she could
have perceived. Second, and more importantly, she is now permanently unable
to accurately retrieve from her memory the knowledge of any related events
which did occur. She would then be unable to "relate such events truthfully."
Thus, the child would not pass even these rudimentary tests of competency.
Id. at 247.
84. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-404 (1965). The right of confrontation
has been labeled fundamental. Id. Therefore, in order for the state to compromise this
right, they will be required to show a compelling state interest which is more important
then the defendant's right of confrontation. Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 317 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987Xvideotape of child witness's testimony was found to violate defendant's right to
cross-examination and confrontation).
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the constitutional rights of the defendant with the state interest of
shielding the child witnesses from the rigors of open court pro-
ceedings.s1 Thus, the next section of this note will consist of a dis-
cussion of the most common attempts by state legislators to
address the issue of balancing the defendant's right to face to face
confrontation and the state's interest of protecting the child
witness.
III. STATE ATTEMPTS AT PROTECTING THE CHILD
WITNESS
In addition to a judicial evaluation of incompetence, or
unavailability for any other reason, a child victim may not be
required to testify in open court in jurisdictions which have
enacted legislation designed to protect the child from the conse-
quences of open court testimony. 86 These protectionary laws are
usually designed to allow the testimony of the child into evidence
while excusing the child from engaging in conventional open
court testimony.
85. See Note, Videotaping Is Not The Answer, supra note 6, at 480-81. The author
notes that there has recently been a "heightened degree of concern for the abused child,
who must face the rigors of a criminal prosecution." Id. at 480.
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (1988 & Supp. 199OXallows for videotaped
depositions of child victims under the age of 16 based on the age and maturity of the child
as well as the nature of the offense and of the expected testimony); Aniz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-4251 to 13-4253 (Supp. 1988Xallows for closed-circuit broadcast of the victim's
testimony into the court); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987Xvideotaped depositions of
child victims of alleged sexual offense under age 17); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1347-13485
(Supp. 1989Xallows for closed-circuit broadcast of child victim aged 10 or under); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986Xprovides for videotaped depositions of child victims of sexual
offenses under the age of 15); FLA. STAT. § 914.16 (1985Xprovides for limiting the number
of interviews to which a child sexual abuse victim must submit to); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 588-
1 to 588-5 (Supp. 1990Xentitled Children's Advocacy Program); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1601-
16-16-29 (Supp. 1988Xentire chapter entitled Child Protective Act); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38
106 (Supp. 1988Xprovides for statements or videotapes of a child of ten or under in certain
criminal actions including cases involving child sexual abuse); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (Supp.
199OXprovides for statements or videotapes of a child of ten or under in certain criminal
actions including case involving child sexual abuse); IOWA CODE § 813.2 (Supp.
1989Xallowing for testimony of child to be completed by deposition and court may require
that a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits one
way viewing by the defendant); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1557 to 38-1558 (1986Xprovides for
admitting recorded statements and videotaped deposition of child victims under certain
conditions).
87. See Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and other
Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV. 645, 655-56
(1985Xquoting Buckley, Recommendations for Improving Legal Intervention in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases, Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2 and Commentary, American Bar
Association, Washington D.C. (1982)). These recommendations provide:
In criminal cases, a child sexual abuse victim should testify at preliminary
hearings or grand jury proceedings only if needed. Where necessary to prevent
trauma to the child, procedures should be developed to avoid the need for the
child's testimony in open court in criminal and civil trials, taking into account
any constitutional limitations.
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To date, there are essentially three procedures utilized by
states for protectionary purposes. They are: (1) videotaped deposi-
tions; (2) closed-circuit broadcasts; and (3) state statutory excep-
tions to the rule against hearsay.' Each of these procedures is
now utilized routinely by various states to protect child wit-
nesses."s Not surprisingly, each of these procedures has been chal-
lenged by defendants on various grounds. ° The result of these
challenges has varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and the
Supreme Court has not, as yet, held on the constitutional validity
of some of these procedures. The following discussion will
examine each of these methods individually, and the challenges to
them, in an effort to determine the continued viability of each.
A. VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION
Videotaping the child's testimony, and then presenting the
videotape at trial is one procedure utilized by states in an attempt
to protect the child victim of sexual abuse."' The main purpose of
legislation providing for videotaped depositions is to record the
first formal statement the child makes to either a police officer,
social worker, or treatment specialist.92 Other rationales for the
Id. Thus, it is apparent that the American Bar Association is sympathetic to the rationale
for excluding child witnesses from testifying in open court. Id.
88. See Note, Videotaping is Not the Answer, supra note 6, at 472-73.
89. See EASTMAN & BULKLEY, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM/WITNESS 1 (A.B.A
1986X[hereinafter EASTMAN & BULKLEY, PROTECTING THE CHILD
ViCTIM/WrrNEss]documenting which states have enacted the various types of
protectionary legislation).
90. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988Xdefendant alleged violation of
6th amendment right to confrontation as well as due process infringement).
91. Note, McGuire v. State: Arkansas Child Abuse Videotape Deposition Laws -
Room for Improvement, 41 ARK. L. REV. 141, 156 n. 11 (1988)[hereinafter Note, Arkansas
Child Abuse Videotape Deposition LawsXlisting the 29 states which have enacted statutes
permitting videotaping of a child's deposition). States which have enacted videotape
deposition statutes are: ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
4251 to 13-4253 (Supp. 1986); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1346-1347 (West Supp. 1987); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 3511 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 92.53-54 (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3433 to 3434 (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Bobbs Merril Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:440.01-440.6
(West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 15 § 1205 (Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
278 § 16D (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1987);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-401 to 415 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.675-93 (Vernon
Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to 402 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.227-31
(1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1147-48, tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1987); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5981-5988 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-13.1 to 13.2 and
§ 40-11-7.2 (Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. §§ 23A-12-9 to 1 0 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2 4-7-116 (Supp. 1986);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-
15.5 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN., VT. R. EVID. 807 (Supp. 1986); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04
(West Supp. 1987).
92. Whitcomb, When the Victim is a Child, supra note 18, at 59. Whitcomb notes
some of the other uses where videotaped depositions have been utilized: "[T]o preserve the
testimony of a witness who is likely to be unavailable for trial, to demonstrate reenactments
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use of videotaped depositions include: (1) reducing the possibility
that the child's memory will fade; (2) preventing the child from
being persuaded to retract his or her story (i.e. these devices will
maintain the strength of the testimony); (3) reducing the number
of interviews the child will be required to give; and (4) providing a
device for the admission of out-of-court statements of the child, in
states that have enacted hearsay exceptions in child abuse cases. 3
While videotaped depositions provide protection for the child wit-
ness, they also contain inherent imperfections that must be
addressed before the testimony they produce can become legally
admissible in a criminal prosecution.9 4
Not surprisingly, the defendant's right of confrontation is gen-
erally at issue when videotaped deposition laws are utilized.95
Certain states have attempted to alleviate the constitutional con-
cern by enacting statutes which allow the defendant to be present
when the videotaped deposition is taken.96 Allowing the defend-
ant to be present when a child's deposition is videotaped may sat-
isfy the defendant's constitutionally mandated right to confront his
witness.97 However, by addressing the right to confrontation in
this manner, these statutes appear to defeat at least one of the
goals of videotaped depositions in the first place. 98 If the primary
reason for videotaped depositions is to shield the child from the
of accidents, and to record the reactions of alleged drunk drivers during behavioral sobriety
tests." Id. Thus, the utility of videotape statutes is not limited to child sexual abuse cases in
all instances. Id.
93. Id. at 60.
94. See generally Note, Videotaping Is Not The Answer, supra note 6, at 494-95
(discussing the problems inherent in videotaped depositions of a child's testimony).
95. See id. (the most important reason for having a child victim's testimony admitted
by videotape technology is to defeat the confrontation clause).
96. As an example of states that allow the defendant to be present during the taping of
the child's testimony see: ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1978); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401-03 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1986).
97. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 272
(5th ed. 1979). Black's defines confrontation as follows:
In criminal law, the act of setting a witness face to face with the prisoner, in
order that the latter may make any objection he has to the witness, or that the
witness may identify the accused. The constitutional right of confrontation (6th
Amend.) does not mean merely that witnesses are to be made visible to the
accused, but imports the constitutional privilege to cross-examine them. In fact,
the essence of the right of confrontation is the right to cross examination.
Id.
98. See Note, Arkansas Child Abuse Videotape Deposition Laws, supra note 91, at 168.
The author articulates the apparently obvious conclusion that, "[R]emoving the
proceedings from the court room to the judge's chambers without removing the defendant
from the proceedings does little or nothing to avoid the possible harm to the child and the
resulting effect on testimony." Id. The author then concluded that statutes which allow the
defendant's presence would defeat the central purpose of the statute. Id.
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rigors of facing the defendant, 9 it would seem that allowing the
defendant the opportunity to confront the child during the taping
of the videotaped testimony would not be different than if the
child testified conventionally in open court. 1° °
Realizing the adverse effects of a rule that allows the defend-
ant to be present at the taping of a child's videotaped testimonial,
a few states have enacted legislation that allows the defendant to
be present at the videotaping, but neither within sight nor ear shot
of the child. 0 1 This type of statute allows the defendant to see and
hear the child victim, and communicate with his or her counsel
regarding the child's testimony, but it shields the child from view-
ing or hearing the defendant." 2
Even these improved statutes have drawbacks. First, the fact
that the child knows of the defendant's presence may affect the
child as much as if the defendant was in plain view of the child.'1 3
Additionally, these statutes may adversely affect the defendant's
right to confront the witness by denying him the opportunity to
99. Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal
Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 985 (1969). Libai assumes that states must strive to
care for the well being of all children found within the particular state's boundaries. Id. He
also described the damaging effect that post discovery of the acts may have on the child:
Psychiatrists, child experts, and commissions appointed by legislatures and
governors frequently claim that child victims are often profoundly disturbed,
either by the offense or by the developments after its discovery. It is generally
agreed by child psychiatrists that the degree of psychic trauma is as much, or
perhaps more, dependent on the way that the child victim is treated after
discovery than at the time of the offense itself.
Id. at 980-81.
It is apparent from this viewpoint that the process of prosecuting a sexual abuse case
may be psychologically destructive to the child. Id.
100. See Note, Arkansas Child Abuse Videotape Deposition Laws, supra note 91, at
170.
101. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 3511 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 92.53-54
(West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3433 to 3434 (Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 174.227(3) (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 753 (West Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-37-13.1 to 13.2 (Supp. 1986); VT. R. EvID. 807 (Supp. 1986).
102. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1988). This statute is a example of
legislation designed to accomplish the goal of preserving the defendant's right to observe
his accuser, while protecting the child from the intimidation of testifying in front of the
accused. Subsection (4) provides:
(a) In a proceeding in which a child less then ten years of age is alleging, denying,
or describing an act of physical abuse or an act of sexual conduct or penetration
performed with or on the child by another, the court may, upon its own motion
or upon the motion of any party, order that the testimony of the child be taken
in a room other than the courtroom or in the courtroom and televised at the
same time by closed-circuit equipment, or recorded for later showing to be
viewed by the jury in the proceeding.
(b) [U]nder this subdivision, only the judge, the attorneys for the defendant and
for the state ... may be present with the child during the child's testimony.
Id.
103. See Note, Arkansas Child Abuse Videotape Deposition Laws, supra note 91, at
170.
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look into the eyes of the child, thus diminishing what has been
described as a primary device for ensuring truthful testimony.1°4
The process of videotaping the child's testimony has gained
support for reasons other than just the mere protection of the
child witness.10 Additional reasons for recording of interviews
and testimony include: (1) providing a permanent record of the
child's initial statements which is beneficial in this context as the
victims are likely to retract their statements in the future;' °6 (2)
providing for the capture on film of, "a child's physical reaction,
body language, and facial expressions of fear, pain, anger and
avoidance - visual reactions that might otherwise never find their
way into words"'10 7 and (3) providing recordings that will be useful
in subsequent therapy for the child because the tape will record
the child's responses before they become tainted by subsequent
questions, the passage of time, or other events, such as the trial.'
It would seem, therefore, that the additional justifications may be
enough to warrant the videotaping of the child's testimony. 09
In conclusion, the videotaping of a potential victim's state-
ments has become a common practice in some jurisdictions." 0
The major benefit of videotape statutes is the reduction of stress
placed on the child with regards to the defendant. However, the
question of abridging the constitutional right to confrontation
must be addressed by the individual states depending on the con-
tent of their particular statute."'
104. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1987).
105. Goodman & Hegeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40
U. MIAMI L. REv. 181, 198-200 (1985); MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of
Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 135 (1985)[hereinafter
McFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations]. McFarlane, addressing the positive effects of
videotaping child victims' testimony stated: "[P]ermanent, first hand records of initial
statements are particularly valuable in a field characterized by a high likelihood of later
retraction by the child victims." Id.
106. See id. See also Summit, Child Abuse Syndrome, supra note 1, at 188. Dr.
Summit stated the following in his discussion of the likelihood of retraction by the child
victim:
Whatever a child says about sexual abuse, she is likely to reverse it... in the
chaotic aftermath of disclosure, the child discovers that the bedrock fears and
threats underlying the secrecy are true. Her father abandons her and calls her a
liar. Her mother does not believe her or decompensates into hysteria or rage....
The girl is blamed for causing the whole mess, and everyone seems to treat her
like a freak.... Unless there is special support for the child and immediate
intervention to force responsibility on the father, the girl will follow the normal
course and retract her complaint.
Id. at 188. Thus, in many reported child sexual abuse cases there would appear to be a high
likelihood that the child will retract his or her story. Id.
107. See McFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations, supra note 105, at 136.
108. Id. at 139-41.
109. See id.
110. For a list of jurisdictions which allow videotaped depositions, see supra note 91.
111. Forman, To keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGs LJ.
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B. CLOSED-CIRCUIT BROADCAST OF THE VICTIM'S
TESTIMONY
A procedure similar to videotaped depositions is closed-circuit
broadcasting. The process of broadcasting the child victim's testi-
mony into the court room via closed-circuit television presents an
alternative protective device for child witnesses. 112  Presently
there are at least twenty states which have enacted closed-circuit
legislation. 1 3 Much like the videotaped deposition, closed-circuit
broadcasting of child sexual abuse victims' testimony has both
advantages and disadvantages.
In analyzing the advantages of closed-circuit broadcasting, it
may be helpful to examine a typical closed-circuit broadcasting
statute." 4 Closed-circuit statutes will generally delineate which of
437, 445 (1989). Forman believes that since many of the videotape statutes are new, their
effectiveness is yet unknown. Id.
112. See State v. Ross, 451 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. Ct. App. 199OXprocess of two way
broadcasting of the witness's testimony held valid).
113. As an example of states that have enacted such statutes see the following: ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. 1 13-4253 (1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1985); FLA. STAT.
§ 92.54 (1985); IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1985); KAN. SEsS. LAWS Ch. 112 (1985); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 421.350 (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 278, § 16D (West 1985); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw §§ 65.00 to 65.30 (McKinney 1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1 (1985); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon 1983); VT. R. EVID. 807 (1985).
114. See EASTMAN & BuLKLEY, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM/WrrNESS, supra note
89, at 19. A model closed-circuit broadcasting statute has been produced by the National
Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy & Protection. Id. This model legislation
provides:
Child Victim's Live Testimony By Two-Way Closed-circuit Television
(1) In any civil or criminal proceeding involving an alleged offense against a child
under the age of [thirteen], the state's attorney, the child's attorney, or the
child's guardian ad litem may apply for an order from the court that the child's
testimony be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be televised by two-way
closed-circuit television. The person seeking such order shall apply for such an
order at least [five] days before the trial date.
(2) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by closed-circuit
television as provided in section 1 if it finds that the child is unavailable to testify
in open court in the presence of the defendant, the jury, the judge, and the
public, for any of the following reasons:
(a) the child's persistent refusal to testify despite judicial requests to do so;
(b) the child's total inability to communicate about the offense because of
extreme fear, total failure of memory, or other similar reason; or
(c) the substantial likelihood that the child will suffer severe emotional
trauma from so testifying.
(3) The court shall support any ruling on the child's unavailability under section
2 with findings on the record. Expert testimony is required to support a finding
of unavailability under section 2(c).
(4) The state's attorney and the defendant's attorney shall be present in the room
with the child and the child shall be subject to direct and cross-examination. The
only other persons allowed to be present in the room with the child during his or
her testimony are the child's attorney or guardian ad litem, those persons
necessary to operate the closed-circuit equipment, and any other person whose
presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-
being of the child.
(5) The child's testimony shall be transmitted by closed-circuit television into the
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the parties involved in the litigation may request that the child's
testimony be taken via closed-circuit television. 1 5 Most often par-
ties such as the prosecutor, the child's attorney, or if provided for
in the particular jurisdiction, the guardian ad litem, may make a
motion to have the child's testimony broadcast into the courtroom
from a remote location."16 Courts have the discretionary power to
entertain such motions when they determine that the child is
unavailable to testify in open court for one of the following rea-
sons: 1) the child refuses the judge's request to testify; 2) the child
is unable to articulate his or her story; or 3) the possibility exists
that the child will suffer severe emotional damage from
testifying.'
7
The advantages of obtaining a child's testimony via closed-cir-
cuit television are essentially two fold. One advantage is that con-
sidering the defendant's rights, closed-circuit broadcasting of
testimony may, as compared to other protectionary methods,
cause the least amount of damage to the defendant's right to a fair
trial."' Since the testimony is live, the departure from traditional
trial procedure is significantly less than if the testimony was
recorded and played back to the court at a later date." 9 Thus, the
defendant's constitutional right to confront his accuser may not be
significantly threatened by broadcasting the testimony of the child
witness into the court room.1
2 0
With regard to the child witness, closed-circuit testimonial
broadcasts also contain several advantages.' 2' Closed-circuit
broadcasting permits the child to avoid personal encounters with
the defendant which could possibly damage the child psychologi-
cally.' 22 In addition, because the child is in a separate room, she or
he will be able to avoid the possible traumatic effects of describing
the incidents of sexual abuse in front of a relatively large number
courtroom for the defendant, jury, judge and public to view. The defendant
shall be provided with a means of private, contemporaneous communication
with his attorney during the testimony. The courtroom setting shall
simultaneously be transmitted by closed-circuit television into the room where
the child is testifying, to permit the child to view the courtroom participants,
including the defendant, jury, judge, and public.
Id. Eastman and Bulkley state that these statutes are important because they may help to




117. Id. at 21.
118. Id. at 21-22.
119. Eastman & Bulkley, Protecting the Child Victim/Witness, supra note 89, at 22.




of people.2 3 Thus, it seems that closed-circuit statutes would pro-
vide the child victim with protection from the rigors of open court
testimony and provide the prosecution with an opportunity to
present a viable prosecution.
Although closed-circuit testimonial broadcasts contain advan-
tages for both the child and the defendant, there are still some
disadvantages that may affect the wide-spread use of such broad-
casts." Much like other protectionary methods that provide for
the absence in court of the child witness's testimony, there may be
a concern involving the defendant's constitutional rights.12 The
constitutional right most likely aggrieved will be the right of
confrontation.
1 2 6
The concerns involved in closed-circuit legislation are not,
however, limited to the sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion.12 7 Other concerns involved with such legislation include the
defendant's right to a public trial.12 The right to a public trial has
been described as follows: "The defendant's right to a public trial,
which is thought to restrain abuse of judicial authority and
encourage public confidence in the judicial process, may be impli-
cated in the public's exclusion from the deposition procedure."129
There is also a concern that the public's first amendment right to
have access to a criminal proceeding may be damaged by a closed-
circuit testimonial broadcast.
1 30
Closed-circuit broadcasting procedures allow the child to tes-
tify about the incidents of sexual abuse without submitting the
child to the possible stigmatizing effects of an open court proceed-




126. See Graham, The State of the Relationship, supra note 16, at 539-62 (describing
the current interpretation of the confrontation clause as it relates to closed-circuit
testimonial broadcasts).
127. See EASTMAN & BuLKLEY, PR OTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM/WITNEss, supra note
89, at 22.
128. Id. See also MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations, supra note 105, at 147-48.
MacFarlane lists other disadvantages of closed-circuit television legislation as follows:
(1) increasing a child's feelings of isolation by separating him or her from
those with whom the child is communicating and from the room where
everything else is going on, (2) the potential distraction or intimidation of the
child by the presence of the camera and other necessary electronic equipment
and, (3) the child's potential difficulty in concentrating on a face and a voice
speaking to him or her from a television monitor over a prolonged period of
time.
Id.
129. Eastman & Bulldey, Protecting the Child Victim/Witness, supra note 89, at 22.
130. Id.
131. See id. While closed-circuit televised broadcasts may allow the child to avoid the
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appears to be a: viable protective device for use in child sexual
abuse cases.
132
C. MANIPULATION OF THE RULE ON HEARSAY
The rule against hearsay operates to exclude out-of-court
statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted from
being admitted into evidence.13 3  Consideration of this rule is
required in any discussion of child sexual abuse prosecution
because very often the child victim may not testify in open court,
and as such, admission of the child's statements will often involve
the concept of hearsay.' 3 4 When this occurs, the reason for the
child's lack of live testimony may become a central issue in the
prosecution of the case.1
3 5
The prohibition of hearsay is not without exceptions. One
such exception allows hearsay evidence to be introduced if the
witness is unavailable to testify at trial.13 6  Often child victims
absence of testimony can be attributed to their being labelled
unavailable.' 3 7 When a witness is labelled unavailable, a court will
be required to interpret the issue of hearsay very closely.' 38  In
order for the prosecution to have the out-of-court statements of
the child admitted into evidence, certain requirements will have
trauma of open court testimony, it must first be shown that the child victim is
psychologically unavailable. Id. In order to show that the child is psychologically
unavailable, the following must be found:
(1) The probability of psychological injury as a result of testifying, (2) the degree
of anticipated injury, (3) the expected duration of the injury, and (4) whether the
expected psychological injury is substantially greater than the reaction of the
average victim of rape, kidnapping or terrorist act. Just as in the case of physical
infirmity, it is difficult to state the precise quantum of evidence required to meet
the standard of unavailability. The factors should be weighed in the context of
each other, as will as in the context of the nature of the crime and the pre-
existing psychological history of the witness.
Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 830 n.18 (D.C. 1981).
132. See People v. Cintron, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 551 N.E. 2d 561 (N.Y. 199OXdenying
attack of closed-circuit legislation on grounds of facial constitutionality).
133. Fed. R. Evid. 802. Rule 802 provides in part, "Hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority or by Act of Congress." Id.
134. See MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations, supra note 105, at 149.
135. See State v. Asfour, 555 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990Xchild's videotaped
statement given to police was considered hearsay and rendered inadmissible).
136. Note, Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases,
83 COLUM. L. REv. 1745, 1748 (i983Xhereinafter Note, Child Hearsay Statements]
(describing the need for hearsay evidence as occurring when the witness is dead or
otherwise unavailable).
137. See Graham, The State of the Relationship, supra note 16, at 562.
138. Id. at 539. Graham defines unavailable as: "If a witness claims not to recall, asserts
a privilege or is unable or unwilling to testify, the witness is in fact unavailable and
considered non-testifying." Id. Thus, the court must then consider the issues pertaining to
hearsay and it's admissibility. Id.
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to be met.13' The United States Supreme Court stated in Ohio v.
Roberts 140 that an unavailable witness's statement is "admissible
only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' ",141 The Court held
that reliability can be inferred when the evidence offered fits a
recognized exception to the rule against hearsay.' 42  Thus, some
states have enacted certain child witness exceptions to the rule
against hearsay.
If the case involves a statement not fitting within a recognized
exception to the hearsay rule, then the evidence is admissible only
if there is a showing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness."' 143 It would appear, therefore, that the out-of-court state-
ments of an unavailable child witness could be admissible so long
as the statements meet the required standards.
14 4
In instances where a child is available but does not testify, a
court will have to further indulge itself with hearsay analysis. The
issue of an available but non-testifying witness was addressed by
the United States Supreme Court in Dutton v. Evans.'45 The facts
of Dutton are significantly dissimilar to cases involving child sexual
abuse. 146  The Court did, however, hold that under the circum-
stances involved the out-of-court statements of an available but
139. See id. (discussing the interaction of the rule against hearsay and the confrontation
clause as it relates to child sexual abuse cases).
140. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
141. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
142. Id. The federally recognized exceptions to the rule against hearsay appear in
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b). FED. R. EVID. 804(b).
143. 448 U.S. at 66. See also WHrrCOMB, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD, supra note
18, at 69. The traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule which are most often utilized in
child sexual abuse cases include: (1) complaint of rape, (2) medical complaint, and (3) excited
utterance. Id. at 69. Thus, a prosecutor who can establish that the statements an alleged
victim makes fit an above mentioned category can show a "particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness" which helps to render the child's out-of-court statement admissible. Id.
144. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1979).
145. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
146. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 76-77 (1970). The facts of Dutton are summarized
as follows:
Early on an April morning in 1964, three police officers were brutally
murdered in Gwinnett County, Georgia. After many months of investigation,
Georgia authorities charged the appellee, Evans and two other men, Wade
Truett and Venson Williams, with the officers' murders.... Truett was granted
immunity from prosecution in return for his testimony. . . . One of the
prosecution witnesses was a man named Shaw. He testified that he and Williams
had been fellow prisoners . .. at the time Williams was brought to Gwinnett
County.... Shaw said that when Williams was returned to the penitentiary from
the arraignment, he had asked Williams: 'How did you make out in court?' and
that Williams had responded, 'If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex
Evans, we wouldn't be in this now.
Id. Defense counsel objected to Shaw's statement on grounds that it was hearsay because
Williams was not present at Evans' trial. Id. at 77-78. He was, however, available and in
fact could have testified. Id. at 88 n.19.
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non testifying witness were admissible.14 The Dutton opinion,
however, does not provide lower courts with a guide to follow in
determining whether the statements in question should be admis-
sible. 14 8 Thus, it appears that while out-of-court statements made
by an available but non-testifying witness may be admissible in
some circumstances, the determination of when those circum-
stances are present remains a clouded issue. However, in order for
the prosecution to have out-of-court statements of a child victim of
sexual abuse admitted, it would generally appear advantageous to
have the child declared unavailable if possible. 149 In an attempt to
create a device that would allow the statements into evidence, cer-
tain states have enacted legislation that creates an exception to the
rule against hearsay.'5 °
In addition to the special statutory exceptions, there is the
possibility for the prosecution to utilize one of the traditional
exceptions to the rule against hearsay.' 5 ' Of the traditional excep-
tions, the prosecuting attorney may be able to utilize the present
sense impression exception.15 2 This exception would apparently
be applicable where the child made the statement shortly after
the purported attack took place.'5 3 Because the majority of sexual
abuse incidents are not immediately reported, the interval ele-
ment of this exception may render the exception inapplicable in
the majority of cases.154
147. Id. at 88. In Dutton, the Supreme Court supported its decision to allow into
evidence the out-of-court statements of an available but non-testifying witness, stating:
"The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to
advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal
trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement.'" Id. at 89 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 161 (1969)). Thus,
because the court allowed the statements into evidence, it must have concluded that the
fact finder had a satisfactory opportunity to evaluate the truthfulness of the prior statement.
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88.
148. Id. at 86. Justice Stewart made it rather apparent that he was concerned with
deciding only the case at hand.
149. See WHITCOMB, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD, supra note 18, at 72-73
(discussing a statute which specifically mentions unavailability of alleged victim as a
prerequisite for admitting child's out-of-court statements).
150. For examples of states that have enacted a hearsay exception, see note 165 infra.
151. See FED. R. EvID. 803 (contains 24 exceptions to the rule against hearsay as
recognized by the federal court system). See also FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (describes the
hearsay exceptions when the declarant has been deemed unavailable as defined in FED. R.
EVID. 804(a)).
152. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(1). This rule provides: "Present sense impression. A
statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter." Id.
153. Id.
154. See Summit, Child Abuse Syndrome, supra note 1, at 186. Summit states:
Most ongoing sexual abuse is never disclosed .... Treated, reported or
investigated cases are the exception, not the norm .... The victim of incestuous
abuse tends to remain silent until she enters adolescence when she becomes
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Another traditional exception to the rule against hearsay that
could be utilized in child sexual abuse prosecutions would be the
excited utterance exception.155 Under this exception, an out-of-
court statement made by the victim while "under the stress of
excitement caused by the event" would be admissible as a valid
exception to the rule against hearsay. 156 It is important to note,
however, that such statements are not automatically admissible.'
5 7
In determining whether to admit statements as excited utterances,
a court will look to various factors.'58 One factor requires that the
statement be considered a spontaneous declaration in order to be
admitted under the exception.159 This factor requires courts to
determine "whether the statement was made while the declarant
was still under the influence of the event to the extent that his
statement could not be the result of fabrication, intervening
actions or the exercise of choice or judgment."' 60 It would appear,
therefore, that in order for this exception to be successfully uti-
lized, the child would have to disclose the incident of sexual abuse
within a very short time after it took place.' 6 1 However, there has
been a relaxation of the temporal proximity requirement by the
courts. 16 2 This relaxation is the result of the courts' awareness that
capable of demanding a more separate life for herself and challenging the
authority of her parents.
Id.
155. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(2). Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 803(2) provides:
"Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Id.
156. Id.
157. See Graham, The State of the Relationship, supra note 16, at 527 (the trial court
must consider numerous factors when determining whether to allow a statement under an
exception to the rule against hearsay).
158. Id. Graham describes additional criteria a trial court must consider when
determining the admissibility of an alleged victim's statements: "Other factors include the
declarant's age; her physical, mental, and, most importantly, emotional condition when
making the statement; the circumstances of the event; and the statement's subject matter."
Id.
159. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
160. Johnston v. Ohls, 457 P.2d 194, 199 (1969). See also WHITCOMB, WHEN THE
VICTIM IS A CHILD, supra note 18, at 70. The authors described the two essential
requirements of an excited utterance as:
(1) a sufficiently startling experience suspending reflective thought, and (2) a
spontaneous reaction, not one resulting from reflection or fabrication. The
requirement of spontaneity is often measured in terms of the time lapse
between the startling event and the statement. Traditionally, the statement
must have been made contemporaneously with the event, but the modem trend
is to consider whether the delay provided an opportunity to fabricate the
statement.
Id. (emphasis in original).
161. See id. at 71. The authors stated the following when discussing the proximity
element in an excited utterance exception: "The child's delay in making the statement may
far exceed even the most liberal interpretation of the excited utterance exception." Id.
162. Id. (noting that there has been a relaxation of the temporal requirement by some
courts when evaluating the validity of an excited utterance exception in child abuse cases).
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young children are not likely to fabricate stories of sexual abuse."
Even with the courts' willingness to extend the proximity
requirement, many cases will involve circumstances that render
this exception inapplicable. As previously mentioned, most cases
of sexual abuse of children are not immediately reported. The
delay in reporting the incident may far outweigh "the most liberal
interpretation of the excited utterance exception."' 164
Because the traditional exceptions to the rule against hearsay
are often not appropriate in child sexual abuse prosecutions, some
states have created their own special statutory exceptions.1
65
While these statutes are relatively new and untested, there will
undoubtedly be a wave of litigation regarding the validity of these
exceptions as cases involving these statutes wind their way
through the legal system.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court has recently granted a writ
of certiorari in a child sexual abuse case.'6 Craig v. State 67
163. Id. See also Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 48, -, 615 P.2d 720, 723 (1980) In
Lancaster, the court stated:
Considerable latitude in temporal proximity is particularly evident in cases
involving assertions by very young children after a stressful experience. This
latitude is a recognition of the fact that children of tender years are generally not
adept at reasoned reflection and at concoction of false stories under such
circumstances.
Id. at -, 615 P.2d at 723 (citations omitted).
164. See WHITCOMB, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD, supra note 18, at 71.
165. See, e.g., Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1989); ARK. R. EVID. 803(25XA) (1987);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 1990); COL. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1987); FLA
STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West Supp. 1990); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, q 115-10 (Smith-Hurd
1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96(6) (West
1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60460(dd) (Supp. 1989); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205
(1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (Vernon Supp.
1990); N.Y.- CRIM. PROC. LAw §§ 65.00 to 65.30 (McKinney 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2803.1 (West Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-68 (Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.120 (1988). North Dakota has recently adopted a child sexual abuse exception to its
hearsay rule. See N.D.R. EvID. 803(24) (effective March 1, 1990). The North Dakota
exception provides:
(24) Child's statement about sexual abuse. An out-of-court statement by a child
under 12 years about sexual abuse of that child or witnessed by that child is
admissible as evidence (when not otherwise admissible under another hearsay
exception) if:
(a) The trial court finds, after hearing upon notice in advance of the trial of the
sexual abuse issue, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient guarantees [sic] of trustworthiness; and
(b) The child either:
(i) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) Is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act
which is the subject of the statement.
Id.
166. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 834 (1990).
involves the prosecution of Sandra Ann Craig, .a Maryland pre-
school operator, for the crimes of child abuse, perverted practice,
and assault and battery."8 Prior to the trial, the prosecution
requested that the child witnesses in the case be allowed to testify
via closed-circuit television in accordance with a Maryland stat-
ute."6 9 The trial judge ruled that, "the testimony of each of these
children in a courtroom will [result] in each child suffering serious
emotional distress and... I believe there's a need and it's appro-
priate to direct that the testimony of these children be provided
by way of closed-circuit television .... -"170 Over the objections of
defendant's counsel the closed-circuit testimony was allowed,
defendant Craig was convicted, and her convictions were affirmed
on appeal. 17  The Maryland Court of Appeals then granted a writ
of certiorari and proceeded to analyze various issues pertinent to
child sexual abuse prosecutions.
172
The Maryland Court of Appeals took it upon itself to address
the question of whether any exceptions to the right of confronta-
tion exist. 173 In doing so, the Maryland court quickly determined
that there were, "indeed, valid exceptions to face-to-face confron-
tation."'1 74 The Court reasoned, however, that these exceptions
were deemed applicable only under very narrow circum-
stances.175 The Maryland court then concluded that in order to
invoke the protection of the statute in question, the child witness
must be initially questioned in front of the defendant. 176 The
Craig Court held that if the trial judge, observing this questioning,
then decides that testifying in the presence of the defendant does
167. 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989).
168. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, - 560 A.2d 1120, 1122 (1989).
169. Id. at -., 560 A.2d at 1122. The Maryland closed-circuit television statute states in
pertinent part:
(a) (1) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law Article
or Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony of a child
victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of
closed-circuit television if...
MD. C's. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(aXIX1989).
170. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, _ 560 A.2d 1120, 1122 (1989).
171. Id.
172. Craig, 316 Md. at -, 560 A.2d at 1122. The Maryland Court of Appeals stated
that it had granted certiorari primarily to re-examine the principles set forth in Wildermuth
v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987) in light of the United States Supreme Court's
pronouncements in Coy v Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798 (1988). Craig, 316 Md. at - 560 A.2d at
1122. In Wildermuth, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-102 was facially constitutional. Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, -, 530
A.2d 275, 287 (1987).
173. Craig, 316 Md. at , 560 A.2d at 1123-25.
174. Id. at ., 560 A.2d at 1125.
175. Id.
176. Id. at -, 560 A.2d at 1127.
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in fact cause the child witness serious emotional distress, then the
statute's protections may be utilized. 177 Thus, the court of appeals
reversed the decision of the lower court because the trial judge
had failed to establish that the young witnesses would experience
serious emotional distress as a result of testifying before the
defendant.
178
The significance of this case is not the decision that the Mary-
land Court of Appeals reached. What makes this case potentially
critical is that the Supreme Court has decided to review it. 179 It
would seem that the Supreme Court has afforded itself an opportu-
nity to clarify the clouded issue of whether exceptions to the right
of face-to-face confrontation exist in criminal proceedings.180 In
addition to establishing whether any exceptions do exist, the
Supreme Court could use this opportunity to supply some gui-
dance regarding when such exceptions should be utilized.
V. CONCLUSION
The alarming frequency with which sexual abuse of children is
being reported demands the attention of the legal profession. As
the quantity of such prosecutions grow, our legal system's inherent
inability to accommodate such litigation becomes more prevalent.
Thus, much reform is required in this delicate area of the law.
Individual states must continue to develop legislation which
will effectively protect the child victim of sexual abuse from the
trauma often associated with live open court testimony in the pres-
ence of the alleged perpetrator. In the process of accomplishing
this goal, however, the right of the accused to face his accuser
must not be arbitrarily discarded. Because the United States
Supreme Court has yet to clearly define the boundaries of the
right of face-to-face confrontation, individual states will continue
to struggle with defining the dimensions of this unsettled concept.
Thus, until the Supreme Court resolves and clarifies issues regard-
ing sixth amendment confrontation, questions about state protec-




178. Id. at _ 560 A.2d at 1129.
179. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 834 (1990).
180. C.f. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988).
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